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Introduction
1 Introduction
In this paper, I investigate whether the effect of a rule on how to act in a social dilemma
situation depends on how it is implemented: endogenously chosen or externally im-
posed. Most importantly, my experimental design allows me to determine the drivers
of the effect of democratic participation: self-selection of treatments, information trans-
mitted via voting, or democracy per se. Since many interactions in real life related to
cooperation are subject to non-deterrent policies, I focus on a rule which prescribes
full contributions to a public good and is backed by a weak sanction for those who do
not comply. For instance, in international environmental treaties between sovereign
nations, like the Kyoto protocol, no third-party mechanism exists to enforce the agree-
ment (e.g., Barett 2010). Small scale common property goods, like fisheries, do have
formal authorities in most cases, but authorities often lack the capacities to monitor,
sanction and enforce (e.g., Ostrom 1990; Kroll et al. 2007). Therefore, this experiment
is in general related to the vast literature on how to design policies in order to foster
cooperation in social dilemma situations in the absence of strong enforcement mech-
anisms.1
However, not the policy itself but rather the process of how it is implemented is at the
focus of my paper. Thus, I contribute to the growing economic literature which invest-
igates whether the effect of a policy depends on how it is implemented. One of Elinor
Ostrom’s design principles characterising robust institutions for managing common-
pool resources is that resource users affected by regulations should be authorized to
participate in making and modifying the rules (Ostrom 1990). Initially this refers to
the importance of local knowledge in devising effective rules. Further - and most of all
- positive aspects of participation have been identified in several field studies. Particip-
ation is suggested to increase the willingness to follow rules or to avoid that externally
imposed regulations crowd out voluntary cooperative behavior (e.g., Ostrom and Na-
gendra 2006). In this line, Bardhan (2000) shows that users of a common-pool resource
tend to manage the resource more successfully when they are genuinely engaged in
decisions on rules affecting their use. Further empirical findings by Pommerehne and
Weck-Hannemann (1996) and Frey (1998), for example, suggest that income tax compli-
ance in Switzerland increases with democratic participation. A central problem with
the interpretation of theses studies is that unobservable confounding factors such as
self-selection into policies could affect the results. A series of laboratory experiments
aim at taking confounding factors into account in more controlled environments and
suggest that the effect of democratic participation is rather nuanced. The majority of
1For overviews, see, e.g., Ledyard (1995), Chaudhuri (2011), and Zelmer (2003).
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the experiments suggest a positive democracy premium, i.e., that institutions are more
effective if they are endogenously chosen via a democratic decision-making process
than externally imposed (e.g., Ertan et al. 2009, Sutter et al. 2010, Dal Bó et al. 2010).
However, other experiments provide a more differentiated and mixed picture. Sut-
ter and Weck-Hannemann (2003), for instance, find that democratic participation in
determining minimum contributions to a public good does not necessarily raise over-
all cooperation levels. Especially participants with relatively high obligations reduce
contributions, if these are democratically determined. In a related experiment, Sutter
and Weck-Hannemann (2004) show that cooperation collapses if groups democratic-
ally reject imposing minimum contribution levels. Tyran and Feld (2006) find that the
effect of democratic participation can cut both ways. Based on a public goods game,
they find that a simple contribution rule which aims at fostering cooperation is more
effective in case it is endogenously chosen than the same rule externally imposed. If
the rule is endogenously rejected, in contrast, the effect of participation tends to be
negative. Drawing on the experiment by Tyran and Feld (2006) and using samples of
students and workers in China, Vollan et al. (2017) conclude that the effectiveness of
democratic participation depends on its conformity with societal values, norms, and
rules. They find that participants cooperate on average the most if the contribution rule
is exogenously imposed, what can be explained with a long history and great import-
ance of authoritarian norms in China. One reason that prevents us from identifying
a coherent effect based on these studies is that potential drivers of the effect demo-
cratic participation are not equally considered, identified and quantified. Dal Bó et al.
(2010) suggest a randomization technique to identify and quantify different drivers of
the effect of democratic participation. Based on a prisoner’s dilemma they introduce
the opportunity to democratically impose a deterrent sanction on mutual defection
which transforms their dilemma into a coordination problem. After taking potential
confounding factors into account, they conclude that the deterrent policy is more likely
to be respected if it is democratically chosen than externally imposed.
In this paper, I complement the existing literature by investigating whether democratic
participation increases participants’ compliance with a non-deterrent intervention. The
democratic decision-making process is considerably simplified in my experiment. Fol-
lowing the experimental literature, participants have to vote for the introduction of an
intervention. It is of fundamental importance to look at non-deterrent interventions
since it provides the opportunity to study how participants follow rules although they
face incentives not to do so and it remains unclear whether the findings by Dal Bó et al.
(2010) can be extrapolated into a setting with a non-deterrent intervention. Based on
the experimental design by Tyran and Feld (2006), the rule in my experiment prescribes
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full contributions to the public good and a sanction for participants who do not com-
ply with the obligation. The sanction is non-deterrent and zero contributions remain
the unique Nash equilibrium in dominant strategies. Furthermore, my paper extends
previous experiments by identifying and separating three potential drivers of the ef-
fect of democratic participation. Theory on procedural utility suggests that people do
not only value outcomes but also the processes. It indicates that being aware of the
fact that the group imposed the policy may directly affect agents’ behavior (Frey and
Stutzer 2005). A second hypothesis is that democratic decision making could also af-
fect behavior because it reveals information to agents on their partners’ likelihood to
favor a specific policy or not, affecting both the agents’ beliefs about the partners’ fu-
ture behavior and thus their own behavior (Tyran and Feld 2006). Finally, while groups
are randomly formed, they are not necessarily identical. One cannot exclude the pos-
sibility that there are unobservable factors that explain both responses to policies and
the policy selected (Dal Bó et al. 2010). Adopting an identification strategy sugges-
ted by Dal Bó et al. (2010), I control for self-selection and separate the total effect of a
democratically chosen contribution rule into a selection, information and a democracy
effect.
Using a laboratory experiment, I observe that a simple contribution rule in a public
goods game backed by a mild and non-deterrent sanction improves contributions un-
der democracy, but not in case treatments are externally given. In line with Tyran and
Feld (2006), contributions to the public good are significantly higher if the contribution
rule is endogenously chosen (through a democratic process) than if it is democratic-
ally rejected. However, after controlling for effects of self-selection of treatments and
the information transmitted by revealing the outcome of the referendum, democratic
participation does not directly affect participants’ contribution behavior anymore. My
findings thus suggest that the effect of democratic participation does not per se in-
crease participants’ willingness to comply with rules which are for the common good,
but at odds with their individual free-riding incentives.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the experi-
mental design of the study. Results are presented in Section 3. A concluding discussion
is provided in Section 4.
2 Experimental design
The experimental design is based on a linear public goods game with subjects ran-
domly and anonymously matched into groups of three for the entire experiment. The
experiment consists of two parts. In Part I, subjects participate in ten rounds of a stand-
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ard public goods game. Each subject i receives an initial endowment of e = 20 Lab-
Dollar (LD) in each round which has to be allocated to either a public good (qi) or
a private good (e − qi). Subject i’s payoff (pii) is given by the private good plus the
benefit from the group’s contributions to the public good multiplied by the marginal
per capita return of β = 0.5, i.e., pii = e − qi + 0.5∑3j=1 qj. Since β < 1 < nβ, com-
plete free-riding (qi = 0) is the unique dominant strategy for all subjects, according to
the standard game theoretic prediction of purely selfish subjects. Full contributions to
the public good (qi = 20) are, in contrast, socially optimal. After ten rounds of this
standard public goods game, Part II of the experiment starts. In Part II, subjects play
ten rounds as in Part I but they can impose a rule at the beginning of this part. The
main focus of my experiment is to investigate whether and, if so, how the effect of the
rule depends on the procedure of implementation. Therefore, I decided to keep the
rule as simple and non-strategic as possible and abstain from introducing rather com-
plex centralized (e.g., Cardenas et al. 2000) or decentralized sanctioning mechanisms
(e.g., Carpenter 2007). Following Tyran and Feld (2006) the rule aims at fostering co-
operation by prescribing full contributions to the public good backed by a fixed and
automatically imposed sanction of s = 4 for subjects who do not comply, i.e., qi < 20.
In case the rule is imposed, subject i’s payoff is given by:
pii =
20− qi + 0.5∑3j=1 qj − 4 i f qi < 2020− qi + 0.5∑3j=1 qj i f qi = 20.
With s = 4 the penalty for violating the proposed contribution is rather low and
zero contributions to the public good remain the unique Nash equilibrium in dom-
inant strategies. Since β = 0.5, partial contribution is never optimal. Complete free-
riding yields a payoff of pii(qi = 0|q−i) = 20 + 0.5∑j 6=i qj − 4. Compliance, in con-
trast, yields pii(qi = 20|q−i) = 10 + 0.5∑j 6=i qj. Compliance is rational if and only if
pii(qi = 0|q−i) < pii(qi = 20|q−i). This would require a sanction of s > 10. How-
ever, s = 4 and, therefore, full free-riding is the unique Nash equilibrium in dominant
strategies, i.e., pii(qi = 0|q−i) > pii(qi = 20|q−i) ∀i. Participants in Tyran and Feld
(2006) vote in a referendum on whether or not to enact the rule. However, Tyran and
Feld (2006) do not explicitly control for confounding factors like self-selection and in-
formation transmitted by voting. Using a within-subject design, Tyran and Feld (2006)
rely on the strategy method, in which subjects make contingent decisions for all pos-
sible outcomes of the referendum. According to standard game theoretic predictions,
the strategy method should yield the same decisions as the direct-response method.
However, the literature suggests that subjects make different decisions in contingent
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Figure 1: Randomization technique adpoted by Dal Bó et al. 2010
Program
decides to
consider 
votes
not 
consider 
votes
Program
decides to
info
no 
info
Program
decides to
implement 
rule
not 
implement rule EndoNoRule
EndoRule
Majority 
decides to
Vote
Program
decides to
implement 
rule
not 
implement rule ExoMinNoRule
ExoMajRule
implement 
rule
not 
implement rule ExoNINoRule
ExoNiRule
(ExoMinRule)
(ExoMajNoRule)
Note: After all participants have voted the program decides randomly whether to consider the votes. In
case the votes are not considered, it randomly decides whether to reveal the information about the out-
come of the voting stage and thereafter whether to implement the rule. Consequently, participants could
be assigned randomly to eight different treatments. However, only six out of all the treatments are of
primary interest, i.e., EndoRule, EndoNoRule, ExoMajRule, ExoMinNoRule, ExoNiRule, and ExoNiNoRule.
The two remaining treatments, i.e., ExoMinRule and ExoMajNoRule, are not considered in the following
analysis and, therefore, placed in parentheses.
responses relative to situations where they face given and known decisions (e.g., Falk
et al. 2005; Brandts and Charness 2011; Jordan et al. 2016).
In this experiment, I rely on a direct-response design and adopt a randomization tech-
nique suggested by Dal Bó et al. (2010) to control for self-selection of treatments and to
disentangle the effect of a democratically chosen contribution rule. Dal Bó et al. (2010)
use a prisoner’s dilemma with mutual defection as unique Nash equilibrium and in-
troduce the opportunity to impose a sanction on unilateral defection. The sanction is
comparatively strong and both mutual defection and cooperation are Nash equilibria.
I investigate the effect of a rather weak and non-deterrent rule. This is of fundamental
importance because strong and deterrent rules set strong incentives, thus cooperation
and compliance seem easier anyway. Furthermore, many situations in real life, and
especially in an environmental policy context, are subject to rather non-deterrent inter-
ventions. Either no supra authorities exist in order to monitor, enforce, and sanction
any policy, or, in case authorities exist, they lack the resources to enforce policies. I
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complement the existing literature by combining the experiments by Tyran and Feld
(2006) and Dal Bó et al. (2010) in order to test whether the effect of a weak and non-
deterrent contribution rule in a public goods game depends on how it has been imple-
mented. The corresponding randomization strategy is summarized in Figure 1. First,
all three participants per group vote simultaneously and anonymously in a referendum
on whether to enact the rule or not. Second, the computer randomly chooses whether
to consider the votes in each group. If the computer considers the votes, the majority
wins. If the computer does not consider the votes, it randomly chooses whether or not
to reveal the information regarding the outcome of the referendum and, in a second
step, whether or not to impose the rule exogenously. After the voting stage, subjects
are informed whether the computer randomly chose to consider votes and whether
the rule is implemented.2 In case participants do receive the information about the
outcome of the voting stage, they do not learn the exact distribution of votes. They
learn whether at least two subjects or at the most one subject per group voted for the
rule.
The eight possible treatments are denoted as EndoRule, EndoNoRule, ExoMajRule, Ex-
oMinRule, ExoMajNoRule, ExoMinNoRule, ExoNiRule, and ExoNiNoRule. Endo denotes
that the votes of the group were considered and Exo denotes that the computer over-
rode the votes. Rule denotes that the rule is implemented versus NoRule. In case the
information regarding the outcome of the referendum is available, Maj denotes that the
majority of the group supported the rule, Min denotes that only a minority supported
the rule. Ni denotes that this information is not available.3
After Part II has been completed, agents fill in a final questionnaire on socio demo-
graphic characteristics as well as attitudes and values adapted from established value
surveys (World Value Survey 2014). I included questions to measure participants’ trust
2Subjects were informed that the computer will randomly decide. However, following Dal Bó et al.
(2010) they were not informed about the exact probabilities. The instructions said that “the computer
will randomly choose whether to consider the votes or not in your group”, “it will randomly choose
whether to reveal the outcome of the voting stage or not” and “it will randomly choose whether to
implement the contribution rule or not”. A translated version of the instructions is provided in the
appendix.
3Only six out all eight possible treatments are of central importance for the following analysis, i.e., En-
doRule, EndoNoRule, ExoMajRule, ExoMinNoRule, ExoNiRule, ExoNiNoRule. The program, however,
decides randomly whether to consider votes, and in case the votes are not considered, whether to re-
veal the information of the voting stage and thereafter to implement the rule. It is thus possible that
the votes are not considered, the rule exogenously implemented (not implemented) and participants
informed that a majority of their group members are against (in favor of) the rule, i.e., ExoMinRule,
ExoMajNoRule. The function of the information treatments is to provide the necessary intermediate
steps between the exogenously imposed and democratically chosen treatments. This is done by com-
paring participants with the same information of the outcome of the referendum across treatments,
i.e., EndoRule vs. ExoMajRule and EndoNoRule vs. ExoMinNoRule. Following this logic, there is no
equivalent for ExoMinRule and ExoMajNoRule under democracy. Therefore, both treatments are not
considered in my analysis.
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level, locus of control, political preferences and political commitments as well as their
acceptance of authorities.
3 Results
The experiment was conducted at the mLab of the University of Mannheim, Germany.
I used the experimental software z-Tree developed by Fischbacher (2007) for program-
ming, and participants were recruited via ORSEE (Greiner 2015). I conducted 17 ses-
sions between October 2016 and June 2017 with a total of 270 participants.4 A session
lasted on average slightly more than 60 minutes and participants earned on average
11.60 euros, with a maximum of 18.00 euros and a minimum of 5.00 euros.
Average contributions to the public good over rounds and across treatments in both
parts of the experiment are summarized in Figure 2. In the first part of the experiment,
both the level of contributions to the public good as well as the pattern are compar-
able to other voluntary contribution mechanisms (e.g., Ledyard 1995; Zelmer 2003;
Chaudhuri 2011). In Part I, participants contribute on average 6.99 LD to the public
good and contributions decrease over rounds with an average of 10.40 LD in round 1
and 3.63 LD in round 10. Although all participants played a standard voluntary con-
tribution mechanism without any interventions in the first ten rounds, there are differ-
ences across treatments in terms of participants’ contributions, especially at the end of
Part I. According to a Kruskal-Wallis test, contributions cannot be considered as equal
across treatments in the last five (p-value 0.066) and three (p-value 0.040) rounds of the
first part of the experiment. More precisely, in round 10 participants in ExoNiNoRule
contribute on average 1.25 LD to the public good and therefore significantly less than
participants in the other treatments.5 Therefore, even before the voting stage and the
assignment to treatments, participants can not be considered statistically identical in
terms of contribution levels.
In line with previous evidence on the restart effect in prisoner’s dilemma games (e.g.,
Andreoni and Miller 1993) and public goods games (e.g., Andreoni 1988), contribu-
tions increase at the beginning of the second part of the experiment (see Figure 2). The
increase is much larger in case the rule is implemented, which leads to substantial dif-
ferences across treatments in Part II (p-value: 0.000, Kruskal-Wallis test) and especially
in round 11 (p-value: 0.000, Kruskal-Wallis test).6 In order to estimate and disentangle
4Panel A of Table 2 summarizes the number of participants by treatment and vote. The two treat-
ments ExoMinRule and ExoMajNoRule are irrelevant for my analysis, therefore the results are based
on the 213 participants in the treatments of primary interest, i.e., EndoRule, EndoNoRule, ExoMajRule,
ExoMinNoRule, ExoNiRule, and ExoNiNoRule.
5Differences are also robust to corrections for multiple hypothesis testing proposed by List et al. (2016).
6In Part II of the experiment, the differences are also robust to corrections for multiple hypothesis
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Figure 2: Average contributions per treatment
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Note: Average contributions to the public good in LabDollar (LD) by round and vote stage results. In
Part I, all participants play a voluntary contribution mechanism. After Part I participants vote in a ref-
erendum on whether or not to enact the contribution rule. Depending on individual votes and the ran-
domization strategy described in Section 2 participants are assigned to treatments in Part II. EndoRule
(EndoNoRule): contribution rule is democratically chosen (rejected). ExoMajRule (ExoMinNoRule):
contribution rule is externally imposed (not imposed) and participants receive the information that the
majority (minority) of their group supported the rule. ExoRule (ExoNoRule): contribution rule is ex-
ternally imposed (not imposed).
the effect of democratic participation, I follow Dal Bó et al. (2010) and initially focus
on behavior in the first round of Part II, i.e., round 11. Since participants can not be
considered statistically identical in terms of cooperation levels in the first part of the
experiment, I use individual differences in contribution levels between round 11 (i.e.,
the first round of Part II) and round 10 (i.e., the last round of Part I) as primary outcome
variable.
3.1 Results from the voting stage
Right after Part I of the experiment has been completed, participants vote in a refer-
endum on whether to enact the rule or not. The vast majority of the 270 participants
wanted the rule to be introduced. More precisely, significantly more participants vote
testing (List et al. 2016).
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in favor of the rule than against it: 196 (72.59%) yes-voters versus 74 (27.41%) no-voters
(p-value: 0.000, Binomial test).
Result 1: Participants vote for rule in the majority of all cases.
The approximately 73% of participants voting for the rule are clearly above the 50%
obtained by Tyran and Feld (2006) and 53% by Dal Bó et al. (2010). However, the
intervention of Dal Bó et al. (2010) differs substantially from the rule used by Tyran
and Feld (2006) and in this experiment. The intervention by Dal Bó et al. (2010) is
comparatively strong and affects the equilibrium of their game, this could explain the
comparatively low level of support.7 I use the same contribution rule as Tyran and
Feld (2006), however, the experiments differ in their protocols. In the experiment by
Tyran and Feld (2006) participants do not interact before they vote on whether or not
to impose the contribution rule. In my experiment, in contrast, participants play ten
rounds of a standard public goods game before they vote. The experience they have
made in Part I and the enhanced understanding of the experiment could drive the
differences in voting behavior.
I define the variable Yes, which is a binary variable for whether participants vote in
favor of the rule or not, in order to analyze participants voting behavior in more detail
via estimating a regression model (see Table 1). In line with Dal Bó et al. (2010) my
results suggest that participants own contributions to the public good in Part I of the
experiment (Coop. Part I: Own) are positively and significantly correlated with voting
for the rule. More cooperative participants are more likely to vote for enacting the rule.
In this line, voting for the rule is negatively correlated with the average contributions
of the other group members in Part I (Coop. Part I: Others). However, the effect does
not reach the conventional significant levels. In addition, my findings suggest that par-
ticipants who are convinced to be able to control events that affect their lives (Locus of
control) are more likely to vote for the rule. Furthermore, males are more likely to favor
the rule compared to females (Female). Finally, I find that that participants’ political
commitment (Pol. commitment) affects participants’ voting behavior significantly. Par-
ticipants reporting a strong political commitment vote significantly less frequently for
enacting the rule than participants with a weak commitment.
3.2 Endogenous vs. exogenous treatments effects: Aggregated
analysis
The main results of Part II of the experiment are summarized in Table 2. Panel A
summarizes the number of observations by vote and results of the voting stage. Treat-
7See Section 2 for a detailed discussion of the differences in interventions.
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Table 1: Determinants of voting
Dependent variable: Yes
Coefficients Average
marginal effects
Coop. Part I: Own 0.084**
(0.042)
0.024**
(0.012)
Coop. Part I: Others -0.032
(0.020)
-0.009
(0.006)
Trust -0.058
(0.123)
-0.017
(0.036)
Locus of control 0.149**
(0.058)
0.043***
(0.016)
Obey authority 0.136
(0.179)
0.039
(0.052)
Democrat -0.01
(0.069)
-0.003
(0.020)
Pol. commitment -0.449***
(0.158)
-0.130***
(0.044)
Female -0.412**
(0.205)
-0.120*
(0.058)
Age 0.002
(0.020)
0.001
(0.06)
Constant -0.233
(0.900)
Observations 216 216
Log likelihood -112.031
Note: Probit regression. Coefficients (average marginal effects) with robust standard errors in paren-
theses in column 1 (2). Dependent variable (Yes): 1 if participant votes for rule and 0 otherwise. Coop.
Part I: Own (Others): average own contributions (contributions of others) in Part I. Trust: index for stated
trust level between 0 (low) and 1 (high). Locus of control stated locus of control on a scale between 1 and
10: 1 high external locus of control, 10 high internal locus of control. Obey authority: index for stated re-
spect for authorities between 0 (high) and 1 (low). Democrat: stated importance of living in a democratic
system on a scale between 1 and 10: 1 not important at all, 10 very important. Pol. commitment: index for
stated political commitment between 0 (low) and 1 (high). *** Significant at the 1% level. ** Significant
at the 5% level. * Significant at the 10% level.
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ment effects shown in Panel B are estimated by the differences in individual contri-
bution levels between round 11 (i.e., the first round of Part II) and 10 (i.e., the last
round of Part II).8 To start the aggregated analysis I derive the total treatment effect
(TotalTrE) of the democratically chosen rule by comparing the treatment effect in case
the rule is democratically chosen (EndoRule) with the effect if it is democratically re-
jected (EndoNoRule). By randomly assigning participants to treatments and condi-
tioning on individual votes, I can decompose this TotalTrE into four components: the
exogenous treatment effect (ExoTrE), the effect of revealing the information about the
outcome of the referendum (In f oE), the effect of self-selection into treatments (SelE),
and the effect of democratic participation (DemoE). Results of the decomposition are
shown in Figure 3. In order to structure the analysis, I extend a framework by Dal Bó
et al. (2010) by explicitly addressing the effect of information transmitted via the res-
ults of the referendum. In this sense, I denote as g(υ|M, I, R) the proportion of subjects
who vote υ ∈ {Y, N} (in favor or against the rule) given the procedure of implement-
ation M ∈ {Endo, Exo} (democratically chosen or randomly by the computer), the
information available of the outcome of the voting stage I ∈ {Maj, Min, Ni} (major-
ity or minority support the rule or no information available), structure of the experi-
ment R ∈ {Rule, NoRule} (rule imposed or not), and let q(υ|M, I, R) be the difference
between contributions in round 11 and round 10 of participants who voted υ given the
structure of the experiment, the amount of information available, and the procedure of
implementation.
Total Treatment Effect - The first two columns in Panel B of Table 2 show that the increase
in individual contributions at the beginning of Part II is substantially stronger if the
rule is democratically chosen than democratically rejected: 12.25 vs. 2.81 (p-value:
0.000, Table 3 - column 1).9 Following Dal Bó et al. (2010), I can calculate the TotalTrE
as weighted average of individual contributions by participants’ voting behavior if I
use the proportion of participants who vote for and against the rule as weights.
TotalTrE = ∑υ∈{Y,N}[g(υ|Endo, Maj, Rule)q(υ|Endo, Maj, Rule)
−g(υ|Endo, Min, NoRule)q(υ|Endo, Min, NoRule)].
This shows that participants contribute on average 9.44 LD more to the public good in
case the rule is democratically chosen than democratically rejected.10 This first obser-
8The two treatments ExoMinRule and ExoMajNoRule are not required to estimate and disentangle the
effect of democracy and therefore not considered in Table 2. A summary of all individual contribu-
tions in Part I and Part II of the experiment is given in Table 4 in the appendix.
9If not mentioned otherwise, p-values in this section correspond to Wald tests based on regression
results in Table 3.
10TotalTrE = ( 1484 ∗ 10.14+ 7084 ∗ 12.67)− ( 1421 ∗ 1.50+ 721 ∗ 5.43) = 9.44.
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Table 2: Individual level data
Considering votes Not considering votes
Information available Information not
available
Vote EndoRule EndoNoRule ExoMajRule ExoMinNoRule ExoNiRule ExoNiNoRule
Panel A. Votes
No 14 14 4 6 13 6
Yes 70 7 29 3 29 18
Total 84 21 33 9 42 24
Panel B. Treatment effects (Differences in individual contributions between round 11 and 10)
No 10.14 1.5 -0.5 1.67 5.54 6.17
Yes 12.67 5.43 12.55 3.67 12.62 8.88
Total 12.25 2.81 10.97 2.33 10.43 8.21
Note: Panel A summarizes the number of observations by vote and result of the voting state across
treatments. Treatment effects are summarized in Panel B. Treatment effects are measured by differences
in individual contribution levels between round 11 (i.e., the first round of Part II) and round 10 (i.e., the
last round of Part I).
vation can be summarized by establishing the following result:
Result 2: Contributions are higher if the rule is democratically chosen than if it is
democratically rejected.
In case both treatments are exogenously imposed and participants do not receive the
information about the outcome of the referendum, the rule does not significantly in-
crease contribution levels (ExoNiRule: 10.43 vs. ExoNiNoRule: 8.21, p-value: 0.357,
Table 3 - column 1). Moreover, by simply comparing these two effects I can replicate
the finding by Tyran and Feld (2006) that the effect of the rule is stronger under demo-
cracy than if treatments are exogenously given (9.44 vs. 2.22, p-value: 0.024).11 How-
ever, the TotalTrE captures at least two changes. A change in treatments (EndoRule
vs. EndoNoRule) and, by design, a change in the proportion of yes- and no-voters
across treatments. Furthermore, under democracy participants do know the outcome
of the referendum. This is not the case if treatments are exogenously given and could
also affect their behavior. Before we take potential effects of self-selection into treat-
ments and the information transmitted via voting into account the naive comparison
11Under democracy, a comparison of average contributions in EndoRule (12.25) and EndoNoRule (2.81)
reveals a treatment effect of 9.44 LD. Following this logic and simply comparing average contribution
in ExoNiRule (10.43) and ExoNiNoRule (8.21) leads to a treatment effect of 2.22 LD.
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Figure 3: Decomposition
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Note: Estimated total treatment effect (TotalTrE), endogenous treatment effect (EndoTrE), information
treatment effect (In f oTrE), and exogenous treatment effect (ExoTrE). Confidence intervals at the 90%-
level. The information effect (In f oE) is given by the difference between In f oTrE and ExoTrE. The
selection effect (SelE) is given by the TotalTrE and the difference between EndoTrE. The democracy
effect (DemoE) is given by the difference between EndoTrE and In f oTrE.
between endogenously and exogenously implemented treatments could be biased. By
conditioning on the proportion of yes- and no-voters or the contributions per treat-
ment, I can separate the TotalTrE into an endogenous treatment effect (EndoTrE) and
a selection effect (SelE).
Endogenous Treatment Effect - The EndoTrE leaves the proportion of yes- and no-voters
constant and captures only the endogenous change in the structure of the experiment.
EndoTrE = ∑υ∈{Y,N} g(υ|Endo, Maj, Rule)[q(υ|Endo, Maj, Rule)
−q(υ|Endo, Min, NoRule)].
In other words, it measures the effect of changing treatments democratically assuming
that the proportion of yes- and no-voters is the same in both treatments. With 7.47 LD
the effect loses some of its strength, but contributions are still significantly higher in
case the rule is democratically chosen than if it is rejected (p-value: 0.006).12 That the
EndoTrE is de facto slightly below the TotalTrE indicates a weak and positive effect of
self-selection into treatments under democracy.
Selection Effect - The SelE is given by the difference between the TotalTrE and the
12EndoTrE = 1484 ∗ (10.14− 1.50) + 7084 ∗ (12.67− 5.43) = 7.47.
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EndoTrE. It captures the effect of the change in the proportion of yes- and no-voters in
EndoRule and EndoNoRule leaving the contributions constant across treatments.
SelE = ∑
υ∈{Y,N}
[g(υ|Endo, Maj, Rule)− g(υ|Endo, Min, NoRule)]q(υ|Endo, Min, NoRule).
The effect of self-selection is given by 1.97 LD.13 In line with Dal Bó et al. (2010) this
indicates that yes-voters show the tendency to contribute more to the public good than
no-voters across treatments. However, the selection effect is statistically indistinguish-
able from zero (p-value: 0.282).
Exogenous Treatment Effect - The ExoTrE captures the change in contributions to the
public good due to an exogenous change in treatments in case participants do not re-
ceive any information about the outcome of the voting stage. As in the endogenous
treatment effect, it leaves the proportion of yes- and no-voters constant across treat-
ments in order to take the effect of self-selection into account.
ExoTrE = ∑υ∈{Y,N} g(υ|Endo, Maj, Rule)[q(υ|Exo, Ni, Rule)
−q(υ|Exo, Ni, NoRule)].
According to Table 2, the ExoTrE is given by 3.01 LD and statistically indistinguishable
from zero (p-value: 0.253).14 In case treatments are exogenously given, the rule does
not affect participants’ contribution behavior. In line with Tyran and Feld (2006), this
leads to the following result:
Result 3: In case treatments are exogenously imposed, the rule does not increase con-
tributions.
Information Treatment Effect - Analogous to the ExoTrE the information treatment ef-
fect (In f oTrE) captures the change in contributions due to an exogenous change in
treatments and leaves the proportion of yes- and no-voters constant. In addition, the
information about the outcome of the voting stage is revealed.
In f oTrE = ∑
υ∈{Y,N}
g(υ|Endo, Maj, Rule)[q(υ|Exo, Maj, Rule)− q(υ|Exo, Min, NoRule)].
13SelE = ( 1484 − 1421 ) ∗ 1.5+ ( 7084 − 721 ) ∗ 5.43 = 1.97.
14ExoTrE = 1484 ∗ (5.54− 6.17) + 7084 ∗ (12.62− 8.88) = 3.01.
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According to Table 2, I can calculate this effect as 7.04 LD.15 In case treatments are exo-
genously given and the information about the outcome of the referendum is revealed
the rule does significantly affect participants’ contribution behavior (p-value: 0.002).
Information Effect - In order to isolate the effect of the information transmitted by the
voting stage, I use the difference between the information treatment effect (In f oTrE)
and the exogenous treatment effect (ExoTrE). Therefore, the information effect (In f oE)
leaves the proportion of yes- and no-voters, the treatments and how they have been
imposed constant and only captures the effect of revealing the outcome of the voting
stage.
In f oE = ∑υ∈{Y,N} g(υ|Endo, Maj, Rule)
[(q(υ|Exo, Maj, Rule)− q(υ|Exo, Min, NoRule))
−(q(υ|Exo, Ni, Rule)− q(υ|Exo, Ni, NoRule))].
It is given by 4.03 LD, but the difference is statistically not different from zero (p-value:
0.239).16
Democracy Effect - Finally, the democracy effect (DemoE) captures the effect of choosing
treatments democratically. It is measured by the difference between the endogenous
treatment effect (EndoTrE) and the information treatment effect (In f oTrE). It leaves the
proportion of yes- and no-voters, the information available and respective treatments
constant. Only the procedure how treatments have been implemented changes.
DemoE = ∑υ∈{Y,N} g(υ|Endo, Maj, Rule)
[(q(υ|Exo, Maj, Rule)− q(υ|Exo, Min, NoRule))
−(q(υ|Endo, Maj, Rule)− q(υ|Endo, Min, NoRule))].
The DemoE is given by 0.43 LD and indicates that democratic participation does not
affect contributions directly (p-value: 0.900).17 This leads to the following result:
Result 4: After controlling for self-selection into treatments and information transmit-
ted via voting, democratic participation does not affect contributions.
Decomposition - Having calculated all the different effects, I can decompose the total
treatment effect of 9.44 LD into four components. It can be rewritten as TotalTrE =
ExoTrE + In f oE + SelE + DemoE. The TotalTrE is given by the effect of the rule if
15 In f oTrE = 1484 ∗ (−0.50− 1.67) + 7084 ∗ (12.55− 3.67) = 7.04.
16 In f oE = 1484 ∗ (−0.50− 1.67) + 7084 ∗ (12.55− 3.67)− ( 1484 ∗ (5.54− 6.17) + 7084 ∗ (12.62− 8.88) = 4.03.
17DemoE = 1484 ∗ (10.14− 1.50) + 7084 ∗ (12.67− 5.43)− ( 1484 ∗ (−0.50− 1.67) + 7084 ∗ (12.55− 3.67)) = 0.43.
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treatments are exogenously imposed (ExoTrE = 3.01), the effect of revealing the out-
come of the referendum (In f oE = 4.03), the effect of self-selection into treatments un-
der democracy (SelE = 1.97), and, finally, the effect of democratic participation itself
(DemoE = 0.43). The decomposition shows that the effect of democratic participation
is not statistically significant and is also rather low in also rather low in magnitude. My
results suggest that the democratic participation explains only 5% of the total treatment
effect.
The absence of a direct effect of democratic participation is robust to restricting the
analysis to contributions in the first round of Part II of the experiment (round 11) or ex-
panding the analysis to average contributions in all ten rounds of the second part.18 By
considering only the average contributions in the first round of Part II, contributions
to the public good are on average significantly higher in case the rule is democratic-
ally chosen than if it is democratically rejected (16.00 vs. 8.05, p-value: 0.000) and the
TotalTrE is given by 7.95 LD. The TotalTrE consists of the effect of the exogenously
imposed treatments (ExoTrE = 6.47, p-value: 0.007), the information effect (In f oE =
0.997, p-value: 0.818), the effect of self-selection into treatments (SelE = 0.929, p-value:
0.649), and the direct effect of democratic participation (DemoE = −0.446, p-value:
0.921). By expanding the analysis to all ten rounds of Part II of the experiment, the
TotalTrE amounts to 6.85 LD (p-value: 0.001). This effect can be decomposed into a
ExoTrE of 7.56 LD (p-value: 0.005), a In f oE of -1.15 LD (p-value: 0.799), a SelE of 0.33
LD (p-value: 0.040), and a DemoE of 0.109 LD (p-value: 0.979). In case the analysis is
restricted to contributions in round 11 or expanded to the average of contributions in
all ten rounds of Part II, I find that the rule increases contributions significantly even in
case treatments are exogenously given. Furthermore, when giving participants time to
learn and coordinate, the effect of self-selection into treatments becomes more import-
ant and statistically significant.
3.3 Endogenous vs. exogenous treatments effects: Individual
level analysis
When I control for self-selection into treatments and the information transmitted via
the outcome of the election, the aggregated analysis in Section 3.2 shows that demo-
cratic participation does not affect participants’ contribution behavior. However, the
effect may vary across individual types of participants, especially yes- and no-voters.
To take individual differences into account, I estimate a series of linear regression mod-
els for the complete sample as well as separately for yes- and no-voters. Table 3 con-
18Contributions in the in round 11 and all ten rounds of Part II are shown in Table 4 in the appendix.
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tains the results. I use simple OLS regressions. Dependent variables are the individual
differences in contributions between round 11 (i.e., the first round of Part II) and 10
(i.e., the last round of Part I) (first three columns of Table 3) and the average contri-
butions in Part II of the experiment (last three columns of Table 3). All regressions
are estimated without a constant and indicator variables for the different treatments to
compare outcomes across the procedure of implementation (Endo vs. Exo), the inform-
ation available (Maj vs. Min vs. Ni) and the structure of the experiment (NoRule vs.
Rule). The difficulty is that participants in groups that choose or reject the rule demo-
cratically may be different from those participants in exogenously imposed treatments.
I can derive unbiased estimates by conditioning on participants’ votes. Furthermore, I
can disentangle the effect of democratic participation by conditioning on the informa-
tion available and the structure of the experiment.
More precisely, I can estimate the information effect by comparing contributions un-
der externally imposed treatments with treatments under exogenously imposed treat-
ments where the outcome of the election is revealed, i.e., ExoNiRule vs. ExoMajRule
if the rule is implemented and ExoNiNoRule vs. ExoMinNoRule if it is not imposed.
Following this logic, I estimate the democracy effect by comparing contributions in
case the rule is democratically chosen or rejected with contributions in case treat-
ments are externally imposed and the information about the referendum are avail-
able, i.e., ExoMajRule vs. EndoRule if the rule is implemented and ExoMinNoRule vs.
EndoNoRule if it is not.
Among participants who voted in favor of the rule, i.e., yes-voters, there is no evidence
that the information transmitted via voting affect participants’ contribution levels. Yes-
voters contribute 12.62 LD if the rule is exogenously given and 12.55 LD if it is exogen-
ously imposed and, in addition, the information about the outcome of the election is
revealed (p-value: 0.985, Table 3 - column 2). I also do not find evidence for an in-
formation effect in case the rule is not imposed (8.88 vs. 3.67, p-value: 0.310, Table 3 -
column 2). Furthermore, I do not find an effect of democratic participation among yes-
voters. Neither in case the rule is implemented (12.67 vs. 12.55, p-value: 0.962, Table
3 - column 2 ) nor in case it is not implemented (8.88 vs. 5.43, p-value: 0.560, Table 3
- column 2). This supports Result 4 that democracy does not affect contributions after
controlling for self-selection and taking the information effect into account.
For no-voters, there is also no evidence for an information effect. Revealing the out-
come of the election does not effect participants’ contributions neither when the rule
is externally imposed (5.54 vs. -0.5, p-value: 0.251, Table 3 - column 3) nor when it is
not (6.17 vs. 1.67, p-value: 0.310, Table 3 - column 3). In case the rule is not imposed,
there is no effect of participation (1.67 vs. 1.50, p-value: 0891, Table 3 - column 3). The
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Table 3: Individual level analysis
Dependent variable:
Treatment effects Average contributions in Part II
All Yes-voter No-voter All Yes-voter No-voter
EndoRule 12.25***
(1.144)
12.67***
(1.259)
10.14***
(2.454)
12.31***
(1.092)
12.60***
(1.109)
10.90***
(1.845)
EndoNoRule 2.81***
(0.738)
5.43*
(2.917)
1.50
(0.964)
5.46***
(1.557)
5.90***
(1.557)
5.24***
(1.634)
ExoMajRule 10.97***
(2.108)
12.55***
(2.155)
-0.50
(0.459)
11.97***
(1.729)
13.00***
(1.501)
4.45**
(1.998)
ExoMinNoRule 2.33***
(0.424)
3.67**
(1.551)
1.67**
(0.721)
6.06**
(2.795)
4.87
(3.698)
6.65**
(2.798)
ExoNiRule 10.43***
(1.617)
12.62***
(2.426)
5.54*
(3.105)
12.15***
(1.905)
13.90***
(1.765)
8.26***
(2.580)
ExoNiNoRule 8.21***
(1.765)
8.88***
(1.716)
6.17**
(3.019)
5.28**
(2.045)
5.64***
(2.080)
4.17*
(2.408)
Observations 213 156 57 213 156 57
Adj. R2 0.581 0.644 0.403 0.758 0.803 0.594
Tests of differences of treatments effects
p-values
EndoRule = EndoNoRule 0.000*** 0.026** 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.008*** 0.027**
ExoMajRule = ExoMinNoRule 0.000*** 0.001*** 0.015** 0.076* 0.045** 0.526
ExoNiRule = ExoNiNoRule 0.357 0.213 0.885 0.016** 0.004*** 0.253
EndoRule = ExoMajRule 0.595 0.962 0.000** 0.866 0.828 0.022**
EndoRule = ExoNiRule 0.839 0.982 0.061* 0.943 0.701 0.249
ExoMajRule = ExoNiRule 0.361 0.985 0.251 0.942 0.535 0.410
EndoNoRule = ExoMinNoRule 0.578 0.560 0.891 0.853 0.798 0.666
EndoNoRule = ExoNiNoRule 0.002*** 0.027** 0.155 0.822 0.855 0.505
ExoMinNoRule= ExoNiNoRule 0.006*** 0.310 0.148 0.942 0.922 0.713
Note: OLS regressions. Differences in individual contributions between round 11 and 10 are the de-
pendent variable in the first three columns. In the second three columns, average contributions in all
ten rounds of Part II are the dependent variable. Standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered at the
group level. All regressions are done for the complete sample (All) as well as for yes-voters (Yes-voters)
and no-voters (no-voters) separately. The independent variables are indicator variables for the different
treatments. p-values correspond to Wald tests on the regression results. *** Significant at the 1% level.
** Significant at the 5% level. * Significant at the 10% level.
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effect of participation is, in contrast, positive and statistically significant if the rule is
implemented. More precisely, the difference in contribution levels between round 11
(i.e., the first round of Part II) and 10 (i.e., the last round of Part I) is -0.5 LD if the rule is
externally imposed and participants receive the information about the outcome of the
referendum. In case the rule is democratically chosen, this difference amounts to 10.14
LD. This shows a positive democracy premium among no-voters if the rule is imposed
(p-value: 0.000, Table 3 - column 3). However, this effect is not strong enough to drive
aggregate results.
4 Summary and concluding remarks
This experiment contributes to the literature by investigating if, how, and why demo-
cratic participation increases participants’ willingness to comply with a non-deterrent
rule which aims at fostering cooperation. My experimental design enables me to identify
and separate potential drivers of the effect of democratic participation. I can determine
to what extent the effect is driven by self-selection into the rule, information transmit-
ted by voting, and democracy per se. Tyran and Feld (2006) report that a non-deterrent
contribution rule is more effective if it is endogenously chosen by voting than extern-
ally imposed. However, they do not explicitly take effects of self-selection and in-
formation transmitted via voting into account. Focusing on a deterrent intervention
which transforms their prisoner’s dilemma into a coordination problem, Dal Bó et al.
(2010) suggest a randomization strategy to derive an unbiased estimate of the effect of
democratic participation. I complement the existing literature by combining the key
elements of Tyran and Feld (2006) and Dal Bó et al. (2010) experiments to test whether
the effect of a non-deterrent contribution rule depends on whether is has been en-
dogenously chosen via a democratic decision-making process or externally imposed
and, if so, to what extent this is driven by self-selection into treatments, the informa-
tion transmitted via voting, and democratic participation per se. Investigating a non-
deterrent contribution rule enables me to investigate the willingness of participants to
follow a rule which is for the common good, but at odds with their individual free-
riding incentives. This is a central characteristic of many interactions in real life social
dilemmas which are subject to non-deterrent policies which do not affect underlying
incentive schemes. In an environmental policy context, for instance, either no supra-
national authorities exist in order to enforce international environmental policies (e.g.,
Barett 2010), or, in case authorities exist at the local level, they lack capacities and re-
sources to actually enforce policies (e.g., Ostrom 1990; Kroll et al. 2007). Furthermore,
deterrent rules set strong incentives and, thus, there is no conflict between cooperation
19
Summary and concluding remarks
and compliance what increases participants’ willingness to follow the rule.
In line with the existing literature, I find that contributions to the public good are sig-
nificantly higher if the rule is democratically chosen than if it is democratically rejec-
ted. In case treatments are exogenously given, in contrast, the contribution rule does
not affect participants’ contribution behavior. A naive comparison would suggest that
the contribution rule is more effective in fostering contributions to the public good in
case treatments are endogenously chosen than in case treatments are externally given.
However, this comparison neglects potential confounding factors and does not neces-
sarily prove that democratic participation increases participants’ willingness to com-
ply with a non-deterrent contribution rule. More precisely, my decomposition reveals
that the apparently different effects are not directly driven by democratic participation
per se. Democratic participation does not affect participants’ contribution behavior if
I take self-selection into treatments and the information transmitted by revealing the
outcome of the referendum into account. Of course, it is very difficult to make direct
generalizations from my experiment, not at least because of the fact that I study stu-
dents’ behavior in an environment where they know they are being observed which
might lead to higher willingness to follow the rule. Furthermore, due to my random-
ization strategy and the high amount of participants supporting the rule, participants
are distributed unequally across treatments. It becomes thus more difficult to provide
evidence for a statistically significant effect of democratic participation in my experi-
ment. However, my findings not only indicate that democratic participation does not
directly and significantly affect participants’ compliance with a non-deterrent contri-
bution rule, it is also shown that democratic participation explains only about 5% of
the overall treatment effect. Therefore, the effect of participation appears to be neither
of statistical nor economic significance.
This is not necessarily a contradiction to the postulate that democratic participation
actually affects behavior. My findings rather show that the effect of choosing a non-
deterrent intervention which aims at fostering cooperation in a social dilemma situ-
ation is a conglomerate of different sub-effects of participation. Differences with the
existing literature suggest that the effect of participation depends on the type of the
intervention. While Dal Bó et al. (2010) find a positive democracy premium in case of
a deterrent contribution rule, my experiment does not provide evidence that people
are more willing to follow a weak and non-deterrent rule if it is democratically chosen
than externally given. This suggests that democratic participation can motivate people
to comply with rules which are in their own interest, but not necessarily with rules
which are at odds with their individual free-riding incentives. Finally, in order to de-
crease complexity, I follow the existing experimental literature and reduce the process
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of democratic decision-making to voting. Thereby, the experimental design obviously
neglects further important aspects of democratic participation like, for instance, com-
munication, deliberation, and different decision rules. It is not the purpose of this
paper to capture democratic decision-making in all this facets, but this could be a an
interesting and important route for further research.
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Table 4: Individual level data (all)
Considering
votes
Not considering votes
Information available Information not
available
Vote EndoRule EndoNoRule ExoMajRule ExoMinRule ExoMajNoRule ExoMinNoRule ExoNIRule ExoNINoRule
Panel A. Votes
No 14 14 4 9 8 6 13 6
Yes 70 7 29 3 37 3 29 18
Total 84 21 33 12 45 9 42 24
Panel B. Average contributions in Part I
No 5.52 6.80 7.65 7.41 5.29 7.75 5.9 5.38
Yes 7.52 7.87 8.85 10.27 6.25 5.63 7.11 5.33
Total 7.19 7.16 8.71 8.13 6.08 7.04 6.74 5.34
Panel C. Contributions at the end of Part I (round 10)
No 3.43 5.93 2.50 0.56 1.25 5.00 4.23 1.67
Yes 3.81 3.86 4.34 5.33 3.35 3.33 4.76 1.11
Total 3.75 5.24 4.12 1.75 2.98 4.44 4.60 1.25
Panel D. Treatment effects (Differences in individual contributions between round 11 and 10)
No 10.14 1.5 -0.5 12.22 6.25 1.67 5.54 6.17
Yes 12.67 5.43 12.55 4.67 6.70 3.67 12.62 8.88
Total 12.25 2.81 10.97 10.33 6.62 2.33 10.43 8.21
Panel E. Contributions at the beginning of Part II (round 11)
No 13.57 7.43 2.00 12.78 7.5 6.67 9.77 7.83
Yes 16.49 9.29 16.90 10.00 10.05 7.00 17.38 10.00
Total 16.00 8.05 15.09 12.08 9.60 6.78 15.02 9.46
Panel F. Average contributions in Part II
No 10.90 5.24 4.45 8.92 5.84 6.25 8.26 4.17
Yes 12.60 5.90 13.00 12.23 6.53 4.87 13.00 4.87
Total 12.31 5.46 11.97 9.75 6.41 6.06 12.15 5.28
Note: Panel A summarizes the number of observations by vote and result of the voting state across
treatments. Average contributions in Part I of the experiment are summarized in Panel B. Individual
contributions at the end of Part I (i.e., the last round of Part I) and the first round of Part II (i.e., the first
round of Part II) are summarized in Panel C and E, respectively. Differences in individual contribution
levels between the first round of Part II and the last round of Part I are summarized in Panel D. Average
contributions in Part II of the experiment are summarized in Panel E.
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Instructions [Translated from German]†
Welcome!
Thank you for taking part in this experiment. Please do not talk to other participants and turn off
all electronic devices such as phones for the whole course of this session. Please read the instructions
carefully and raise your hand if you have any questions.
This experiment regards individual decision behaviour. At the end of the experiment, you will receive
an individual payment anonymously and in cash. Your payment will be based on the decisions you and
your fellow participants will have taken as well as a random component. During the experiment, your
payment will be calculated in so-called LaborDollar (LD). After the experiment, the total sum of LD will
be converted into euros. The exchange rate is:
2 LD = 1 euro.
During the experiment, you will take your decisions anonymously. Only the experimenter will know
about your identity. Of course, all provided information will be treated in strict confidence.
Rules of the experiment
The experiment consists of two parts (Part I and Part II). For the whole course of the experiment, all par-
ticipants are divided into groups of three. The group constellations do not change and every participant
inside their respective group will face the same decision scenarios.
Part I
In Part I, we will ask you and your fellow participants to take decisions in ten separate rounds. At the
beginning of each round, you and your fellow group members will be endowed with 20 LD, respectively.
You (as well as your fellow group members) will then have to decide on the amount of LD that you wish
to contribute to a joint project. Your contribution, q, can be between be 0 and 20 LD.
The individual payment (in LD) for all three participants is calculated as follows:
Payment = (20 – Contribution of the participant) + 0.5·(Total sum of contributions)
As an example, if the other two group members contribute together 40 LD while your contribution is 10
LD, your individual payment will be calculated as follows:
Payment = (20 – 10) + 0.5·(40 + 10) = 35
If on the other hand, both group members contribute 40 LD in total and you refrain from paying by
entering 0 LD, your individual payment will be calculated as follows:
Payment = (20 – 0) + 0.5·(40 + 0) = 40
†Explanatory notes are given in square brackets.
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Part I consists of ten separate rounds. In each round, you will face the same decision task and interact
with the same two group members. After each decision, you will be informed on the average values
as well as the contributions and payments regarding the other two group members. At the beginning,
there will be two test rounds. They are not relevant for disbursement.
Part II
As in Part I, we will ask you and your fellow participants to take decisions in ten separate rounds. You
will be part of the same group, which remains unchanged in its constellation. Again, at the beginning
of each round, you and your fellow group members will be endowed with 20 LD, respectively. The
decision tasks are the same as in Part I. You (as well as your fellow group members) will have to decide
on the amount of LD that you wish to contribute to a joint project. Your contribution, q, can be between
be 0 and 20 LD.
Contrary to Part I, it is now possible to introduce a contribution rule. It stipulates that all group members
shall contribute the total sum of LDs endowed at the beginning (q = 20) to the joint project. Participants
who do not abide by this rule shall pay a fee of 4 LD.
If a participant adheres to the rule (q = 20), their individual payment will be calculated as follows:
Payment = (20 – 20) + 0.5·(20 + Total sum of contributions made by all the other group members.)
If a participant refrains from adhering to the rule (q < 20), their individual payment will be calculated
as follows:
Payment = (20 – Contribution of the participant) + 0.5·(20 + Total sum of contributions made by all the
other group members) – 4
As an example, if the other two group members contribute a total sum to the tune of 40 LD while your
contribution is 10 LD, your individual payment will be calculated as follows:
Payment = (20 – 10) + 0.5·(40 + 10) – 4 = 31
If on the other hand, both group members contribute 40 LD in total and you refrain from paying by
entering 0 LD, your individual payment will be calculated as follows:
Payment = (20 – 0) + 0.5·(40 + 0) – 4 = 36
Whether the rule is introduced or not depends on the following: Firstly, the group decides on introduc-
tion of the rule by majority vote. Secondly, it is decided at random, whether the group’s decision will
be taken into account. After the voting, you will be informed on whether the group’s decision will be
taken into consideration.
• If the group’s decision is taken into account, you will be informed on the voting results. The
decision will be taken based on the group’s majority. For example, if two out of the three group
members vote in favour of the rule, it will be introduced. If only one group member is in favour,
the rule will not be introduced.
• If the group’s decision is not taken into account, the decision on introducing the contribution rule
will be taken at random. Furthermore, it is decided at random, whether you will be informed
about the voting results.
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In total, the experiment is made up of 20 separate rounds (10 rounds for Part I and 10 rounds for Part
II). At the end of the experiment, you will receive the payment of one of the 20 rounds in euros. The
round which will serve as the basis of your payment will be selected at random. For this reason, we
recommend you to decide for each round as if it was the basis of your payment.
Control Questions (please fill in)
1. Suppose that in Part I, your contribution to the joint project amounted to 15 LD. The other two
group members payed 15 LD in total. What is your individual payment?
My payment is _______
2. Suppose that in Part I, your contribution to the joint project amounted to 5 LD. The other two
group members payed 15 LD in total. What is your individual payment?
My payment is _______
3. Suppose that in Part I, the two other group members contributed their total initial sum to the joint
project. Which contribution would produce the maximum individual payment (please tick)?
O 0 LD O 5 LD O 10 LD O 15 LD O 20 LD
4. Suppose that in Part I, the two other group members contributed their total initial sum to the joint
project. Which contribution would produce the maximum payment for your group (please tick)?
O 0 LD O 5 LD O 10 LD O 15 LD O 20 LD
5. Suppose that in Part II, the contribution rule was implemented and your contribution to the joint
project amounted to 20 LD. The other two group members payed 20 LD in total. What is your
individual payment? My payment is: _______
6. Suppose that in Part II, the contribution rule was implemented and your contribution to the joint
project amounted to 10 LD. The other two group members payed 20 LD in total. What is your
individual payment?
My payment is: _______
7. Suppose that in Part II, the contribution rule was implemented and the two other group members
contributed their total initial sum to the joint project, respectively. Which contribution would
produce the maximum individual payment (please tick)?
O 0 LD O 5 LD O 10 LD O 15 LD O 20 LD
8. Suppose that in Part II, the contribution rule was implemented and the two other group members
contributed their total initial sum to the joint project, respectively. Which contribution would
produce the maximum payment for your group (please tick)?
O 0 LD O 5 LD O 10 LD O 15 LD O 20 LD
Please raise your hand after you finished answering all questions. We will then check your answers.
The experiment will start once all participants have successfully completed this test.
Good luck!
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